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Two Ways of Learning Brand Associations
STIJN M. J. VAN OSSELAER
CHRIS JANISZEWSKI*
Four studies show that consumers have not one but two distinct learning processes
that allow them to use brand names and other product features to predict con-
sumption benefits. The first learning process is a relatively unfocused process in
which all stimulus elements get cross-referenced for later retrieval. This process
is backward looking and consistent with human associative memory (HAM) models.
The second learning process requires that a benefit be the focus of prediction
during learning. It assumes feature-benefit associations change only to the extent
that the expected performance of the product does not match the experienced
performance of the product. This process is forward looking and consistent with
adaptive network models. The importance of this two-process theory is most ap-
parent when a product has multiple features. During HAM learning, each feature-
benefit association will develop independently. During adaptive learning, features
will compete to predict benefits and, thus, feature-benefit associations will develop
interdependently. We find adaptive learning of feature-benefit associations when
consumers are motivated to learn to predict a benefit (e.g., because it is perceived
to have hedonic relevance) but find HAM learning when consumers attend to an
associate of lesser motivational significance.
Associations play an important role in consumers’ prod-uct evaluations and choices. Brand associations are
fundamental to our understanding of inference making
(Alba, Hutchinson, and Lynch 1991), categorization (Sujan
1985), product evaluation (Broniarczyk and Alba 1994), per-
suasion (Greenwald and Leavitt 1984), and brand equity
(Keller 1993, 1998). Fundamental to all of these literatures
is the assumption that consumers use brand names and prod-
uct attributes as retrieval cues for information about product
performance. In effect, brand names and product attributes
are the links to diagnostic information about the product
(Feldman and Lynch 1988; Hutchinson and Alba 1991).
Two classes of models have been advanced to explain
how associations between brand names and benefits form,
change over time, and effect consumer decisions. The first
class of models has been championed by Keller (1993, 1998)
and can be traced to Anderson and Bower’s (1973) Human
Associative Memory (HAM) theory (see also Anderson
1983, 1993; Anderson and Lebiere 1998). According to the
HAM theory, declarative knowledge is represented as a net-
work of concept nodes connected by links that are strength-
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ened each time two events co-occur. Thus, the more a brand
name co-occurs with a benefit, either through indirect or
direct experience, the stronger the link between the brand
name and the benefit. The second class of models, adaptive
network models, have been championed by van Osselaer
(Janiszewski and van Osselaer 2000; van Osselaer and Alba
2000) and can be traced to the classical conditioning liter-
ature (e.g., Gluck and Bower 1988; Rescorla and Wagner
1972; Rumelhart, McClelland, and the PDP Research Group
1986). According to these adaptive network models, asso-
ciation strengths update and evolve as cues interact, and
often compete, to predict outcomes. Thus, whereas HAM
models hold that cues are learned independently, adaptive
network models hold that cues interact. That is, the strength
of the association between a brand name and a benefit de-
pends on how uniquely a brand name can predict the benefit.
To date, there has been a limited appreciation of the rel-
evance of these two classes of models for understanding
brand associations. Consumer learning research has usually
treated products as single, aggregate objects instead of con-
glomerates of features such as family brand names, subbrand
names, and attributes. When products are perceived in the
aggregate, cue interaction is not an issue and both classes
of models make largely the same predictions. Even the few
consumer learning studies that have presented products as
multiple-cue stimuli (e.g., Hutchinson and Alba 1991;
Meyer 1987) were not designed to separate the two classes
of models. Recently, however, Janiszewski and van Osselaer
(2000) designed a series of five experiments that explicitly
contrasted the two classes of models in a brand association
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context and found strong cue interaction effects. Van Os-
selaer and Alba (2000) also found a persistent cue interaction
effect (blocking) and showed that this effect could not be
explained by a backward-looking causal reasoning process.
When this consumer evidence is combined with the growing
number of demonstrations of cue interaction in the category,
causal and multiple-cue probability learning literatures (e.g.,
Chapman and Robbins 1990; Dickinson, Shanks, and Ev-
enden 1984; Gluck and Bower 1988; Kruschke 1996; Krus-
chke and Johansen 1999; Lopez et al. 1998; Shanks 1991),
one is tempted to conclude that cue interaction might be
universal in consumer learning of product associations. This
would imply either that HAM models need to be extended
to explain cue interaction phenomena or that all product
associations are learned through an adaptive process that is
best described by adaptive network models. The latter would
imply that HAM theory is no longer a viable explanation
of how product associations are formed, updated, and, ul-
timately, lead to evaluations and choices.
The goal of this article is to show that HAM models and
adaptive learning models describe two unique approaches
to learning the brand associations that are subsequently used
to make predictions about consumption benefits. We provide
insight into the qualitative differences between the processes
responsible for each type of learning and predict when each
type of learning is most likely to drive consumers’ product
evaluations. Study 1 shows that consumers adaptively learn
associations between brand names and product benefits
when a target benefit is the focus of prediction during learn-
ing but that they engage in HAM learning of a secondary
benefit that is not the focus of prediction. Study 2 rules out
the possibility that the learning system is constrained to
adaptive learning of a single benefit by showing that con-
sumers can adaptively learn about two benefits, provided
both benefits are the focus of prediction during learning.
Study 3 shows that merely paying attention to an outcome
is insufficient to produce adaptive learning. Rather, an out-
come has to be significant enough for the learning system
to be motivated to focus on learning how to predict that
outcome. Study 4 shows that people can be discouraged
from relying on adaptively learned associations and instead
rely on HAM learned associations when they are asked to
retrospect about their product experiences. Together, the
studies provide support for a two-process system that has
HAM learning as its foundation but engages in adaptive
learning when attention is directed at significant outcomes.
MODELING ASSOCIATIONS
Models of associations in memory attempt to explain two
cognitive events. First, why do cues activate some concepts
but not others? Second, why does the likelihood that a cue
will activate a concept change over time? Insight into these
issues relates directly to our understanding of how consum-
ers retrieve brand names, product attributes, and sources of
marketing communications from memory (e.g., Alba et al.
1991; Nedungadi 1990; Pham and Johar 1997). Associative
models also inform us about why extending a brand name
to lower quality products hurts brand equity (Loken and
John 1993), why brands can extend to some categories but
not others (Boush and Loken 1991; Broniarczyk and Alba
1994; Park, Milberg, and Lawson 1991), why brand exten-
sions can hurt brand beliefs but not flagship product beliefs
(John, Loken, and Joiner 1998), and why brand alliances
can create expectations of a superior product (Park, Jun, and
Shocker 1996) and can benefit a weaker partner (Simonin
and Ruth 1998). Thus, understanding how associations be-
tween brand names and benefits form and change over time
is a fundamental research issue.
Two general classes of models have been advanced to
explain how the associations that consumers use to predict
benefits develop over time. The first class of models have
evolved from the HAM theory of human cognition (An-
derson and Bower 1973). The second class of models have
evolved from the Rescorla-Wagner model of conditioned
learning (Rescorla and Wagner 1972). Interestingly, the
models make both convergent and divergent assumptions
about the learning processes responsible for changes in the
strength of associations between cues and outcomes. We
provide a general description of the two classes of models
and their similarities and differences below, as well as verbal
descriptions of two representatives of each class of models,
chosen because they are the most current, prototypical, and
empirically supported in their respective literatures.
The HAM Models
Two types of models can be distinguished within the
HAM tradition, connectionist models and Bayesian models
(see App. A for detailed review). These models have sim-
ilarities and differences. With respect to similarities, both
types of models represent declarative knowledge as a net-
work of concept nodes connected by associative links. In
these models, the association strength between a cue and an
outcome, as well as the activation of the outcome on pre-
sentation of the cue, depend critically on the frequency of
co-occurrence between the cue and the outcome. These mod-
els assume that the learning of associations between one
cue and an outcome is not dependent on the presence of
other cues and their associations with the same outcome.
That is, learning is cue independent.
The primary difference between the connectionist and
Bayesian models is in the way that they represent learning.
Connectionist models employ a simple Hebbian or “coin-
cident activation” learning rule (e.g., McClelland 2000; Ru-
melhart et al. 1986). One example of these models is the
simple Direct Association (DA) model described by Jani-
szewski and van Osselaer (2000), in which each cue is con-
nected to each outcome, each connection is strengthened
whenever a cue and an outcome co-occur, and incoming
activation to an outcome node is combined additively. Bay-
esian models take the form of statistical Bayesian inference.
The prime example of these models is Anderson’s Adaptive
Control of Thought-Revised (ACT-R) model (Anderson
1993; Anderson and Lebiere 1998). According to the ACT-
R model, the activation of an outcome node is a function
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of (1) that node’s base level of activation and (2) incoming
activation to the outcome node from cueing nodes. Base-
level activation is a function of the frequency and recency
of the outcome’s occurrence. Incoming activation is an ad-
ditive sum of association strengths from cues to the outcome,
weighted by the activation of the cues. Association strengths,
in turn, are dependent on a number of factors, including
preexperimental priors, whether the outcome is more likely
to occur in a cue’s presence than in that cue’s absence, and,
importantly, frequency of cue-outcome co-occurrence. It is
also important to note that, according to the ACT-R model,
learning of cue-outcome associations is not affected directly
by the presence of other cues and their associations with
the same outcome. Thus, like the other HAM models, ACT-
R association strengths depend on the frequency with which
a cue and an outcome occur together, regardless of the as-
sociations that other, also-present cues have formed with the
same outcome.
Adaptive Network Models
Learning in the classical conditioning tradition, and in the
category, causal, and multiple-cue probability learning work
based in this tradition, is often described using adaptive
network models (e.g., Gluck and Bower 1988; Kruschke
and Johansen 1999; Pearce 1994). Like HAM models, these
models represent knowledge as a network of nodes con-
nected by associative links. Moreover, like HAM models,
activation of a noninput node is a sum of incoming acti-
vations. Finally, like the Hebbian HAM models, the models
are connectionist in nature.
Two examples of adaptive network models that have
found considerable empirical support are the Least Mean
Squares (LMS) model (Gluck and Bower 1988) and Pearce’s
(1994) configural model (see App. A for detailed review).
In the basic LMS model (e.g., Gluck and Bower 1988; Jan-
iszewski and van Osselaer 2000), a single layer of input
nodes is connected to a single layer of output nodes, and
the connections are updated using the simple Delta error
reduction learning rule. Pearce’s (1994) configural model
adds two hidden layers of nodes between input and output
nodes. One extra layer allows the model to explain a re-
duction of attention to each cue when multiple cues are
present. The other extra layer represents configurations of
stimulus elements, leading the model to predict sensitivity
to specific combinations of stimulus elements.
The distinguishing feature of both types of adaptive net-
work models is the error-driven learning rule. That is, up-
dating of associations only takes place to the extent that the
learning system is not already correctly predicting an out-
come. Thus, increasing the frequency of cue-outcome co-
occurrence does not necessarily increase the strength of the
association between a cue and an outcome. In addition, be-
cause predicted outcomes and, hence, errors are influenced
by all present cues (because of the fact that output activation
is a sum of incoming activations), updating one cue’s as-
sociation with an outcome depends on the strength of the
associations of other, copresent cues with the same outcome.
Thus, the cue additivity and error reduction properties to-
gether create a cue-interdependence or cue-interaction prop-
erty—the associations between multiple cues and an out-
come are learned interdependently.
Two important examples of cue-interactive learning are
the blocking and unblocking phenomena. If a cue has a
strong association with an outcome (i.e., predicts it will
occur), simultaneous presentations of an additional cue will
not lead that cue to develop a strong association with the
outcome, regardless of its frequency of co-occurrence with
the outcome. The predictive ability of the first cue blocks
learning about the second cue. In contrast, if a cue has a
negative association with the outcome (i.e., predicts it will
not occur), but the presentation of an additional cue leads
to the outcome, then the association between the additional
cue and the outcome will have to be strongly positive to
make the sum of the activation from the combined cues
positive. The additional cue is unblocked. Together, the
blocking and unblocking phenomena lead to situations in
which an unblocked cue that co-occurs with an outcome
less frequently than a blocked cue still ends up with a
stronger outcome association.
TWO ASSOCIATIVE LEARNING
PROCESSES
Although recent evidence is consistent with the view that
adaptive network models can account for all associative
learning, it is also possible that there are two distinct types
of associative learning processes that can both drive eval-
uations and choices. The first is a process characterized by
cue independence that is best described by models in the
HAM tradition. The second is a process characterized by
cue interaction that is best described by adaptive network
models. The possibility that product associations are not
always learned through an adaptive learning process is con-
sistent with the existence of a small number of examples in
the literature showing a lack of cue interaction. However,
the ability of these examples to disprove the universality of
adaptive learning has been disputed, for example, because
the lack of interaction between outcomes was wrongly
framed as a lack of interaction between cues (Waldmann
and Holyoak 1992; see also Shanks et al. 1996; Shanks and
Lopez 1996; Van Hamme, Kao, and Wasserman 1993), be-
cause chunking made multiple-cue stimuli into single-cue
stimuli (Williams, Sagness, and McPhee 1994), or just be-
cause evidence of the absence of cue interaction was based
on null-effect findings (e.g., Baeyens et al. 1996; Baeyens
et al. 1998). Thus, whether or not people have two asso-
ciative learning processes that can be used to make outcome
predictions is a timely issue.
Adaptive Learning
Our goal is not only to propose that two processes are
involved in associative learning but to provide some insight
into the qualitative nature of each process and situations in
which each process is likely to be dominant. Closer ex-
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amination of the learning rule that is central to the adaptive
network models (see App. A) yields insights about the type
of process they describe. The structure of their learning
equation implies a specific type of process—one that is es-
sentially forward looking and adaptive. First, a prediction
is made about an outcome. Then, feedback is received about
the outcome in the form of the actually experienced level
of the outcome. Next, association strengths are updated to
improve prediction on the next occasion. This prediction-
feedback-update process continues until prediction is per-
fect. The process is directional and geared toward optimizing
a prediction on the next occasion. Associations go from cues
to outcomes so that activation can flow forward for the
purpose of prediction. Feedback may flow backward, but
activation does not. This implies that judgments about an
outcome on the basis of information about a cue do not
necessarily yield the same answers as judgments about a
cue on the basis of an outcome (see Farquhar and Herr
[1993] and Price and Yates [1995] for examples of such
associative asymmetry).
The forward-looking adaptivity of the system also leads
to association strengths that do not reflect each experience
with a cue and an outcome equally. The extent to which a
co-occurrence between a cue and an outcome is reflected in
the strength of their association depends heavily on when
that co-occurrence takes place and on the presence of other
cues. This is reflected in findings of strong order effects.
For example, Janiszewski and van Osselaer (2000) asked
subjects to taste a series of eight samples of baked goods
and to rate their taste quality. The superior tasting samples
were the third, fourth, seventh, and eighth samples and were
labeled “Treats with Nu-Oil,” “Goodies,” “Treats,” and
“Goodies with Oilean.” They found that the ingredient brand
Nu-Oil became more associated with the benefit of good
taste than the ingredient brand Oilean, even though each
subbrand described exactly one superior tasting product. Ac-
cording to the adaptive network models, subjects learned to
predict that a product would taste superior based on their
initial positive experience with the Goodies product; hence,
the Oilean brand name was blocked from acquiring asso-
ciative strength on the subsequent experience with the Good-
ies with Oilean product. In contrast, the initial experience
with the Treats with NuOil product allowed subjects to as-
sociate both brand names with superior taste because both
were novel and did not already predict superior taste.
Van Osselaer and Alba (2000, experiment 2B) provide
additional evidence that cue interaction results from a for-
ward-looking learning system. In their experiment, they cre-
ated a situation in which the retrospective frequencies of an
outcome given two cues were the same for both cues. Thus,
a backward-looking process should lead to both cues being
learned equally well, and no cue interaction should occur.
However, they also created the situation such that a forward-
looking process would lead to cue interaction. They found
a strong cue interaction effect, indicating that consumer
learning of brand associations is forward looking.
Finally, it is important to recognize that adaptive learning
is a selective process. Outcomes have a different status than
cues. Cues are used to predict outcomes, not the other way
around. Thus, some distinction has to be made between
elements that are used as predictors and elements that are
used as the outcome to be predicted. It is very well possible
that such a distinction is made automatically, but it does
suggest a (automatic or nonautomatic) motivation to focus
on predicting some elements and not others. We hypothesize
that for adaptive learning (and, hence, cue interaction) to
occur, consumers need to focus on a stimulus element as
outcomes to be predicted. We also expect that predictive
focus requires motivation, which should depend heavily on
the perceived hedonic relevance of the outcome. For ex-
ample, when learning about a product category, consumers
should be more likely to focus on predicting characteristics
of the consumption experience that are perceived to have
rewarding or punishing implications (i.e., the taste experi-
ence provided by a food item) than on characteristics of the
product that are less directly linked to the quality of the
consumption experience (i.e., ingredients of a food item).
HAM Learning
The HAM models seem to reflect a qualitatively different
process than the adaptive network models. In HAM models,
there are no predictions made that are tested and compared
with feedback information. Instead, learning reflects the ba-
sic Hebbian learning principle of “what fires together, wires
together.” In addition, there is no real difference between
the different stimulus elements. For example, it is essentially
arbitrary which stimulus element is designated as cue or
outcome in the DA model, as they have exactly the same
function in the model. These characteristics of HAM-based
models suggest that the process underlying HAM models
might be less focused than adaptive learning.
We believe there are many situations in which consumers
are not focusing on predicting a particular element of a
stimulus. Consumers may lack the motivation to predict
outcomes, may have difficulty identifying a relevant out-
come, or may simply be in a situation where a relevant
outcome does not exist. In other situations, consumers may
be trying to predict one outcome, but not others, about which
information is also available. In such situations, it may be
better simply to store elements of the experience. In this
storage process, all elements are cross-referenced by estab-
lishing simple associations that are strengthened each time
two elements appear together. When consumers later are in
a situation in which they need to predict one element based
on the presence of a second element, they will retrospec-
tively try to recall what level of the first element was paired
with the present level of the second element. Thus, we pro-
pose that there are many situations in which consumers use
a backward-looking, cue-independent process to make pre-
dictions about product performance and that this process is
best described by HAM learning models.
There is some evidence for the existence of associations
that (1) are not subject to cue interaction and (2) co-exist
with other associations that are subject to cue interaction.
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Van Osselaer and Alba (2000) asked consumers to learn
how to predict the quality of a white-water raft using 16
product profiles. They found that when consumers learned
to predict a desired benefit based on one predictive cue in
the first four profiles, they failed to learn the predictive value
of an additional predictive cue that was introduced later.
This is a typical cue interaction phenomenon predicted by
adaptive learning models. However, when van Osselaer and
Alba (2000, experiment 2A) asked subjects to recollect and
report the pattern of co-occurrence between the additional
cue and the benefit prior to making quality predictions, the
additional attribute had more effect on quality predictions.
Thus, the cue interaction effect was attenuated. In hindsight,
this finding might be interpreted as evidence for the exis-
tence of a second associative learning process. It is possible
that the retrospective retrieval instructions encouraged peo-
ple to use associations formed as a consequence of HAM
learning and to ignore associations formed as a result of
adaptive learning. However, van Osselaer and Alba (2000)
mention that the attenuation result could result from sub-
jects’ desire to be consistent in their public judgments of
co-occurrence and quality.
In addition to van Osselaer and Alba’s (2000) results,
which suggest that there are cue-independent associations
that can influence product judgments, there is evidence sug-
gesting that the person’s focus of learning moderates
whether adaptive or HAM learning drives their judgments.
Hutchinson and Alba (1991) find that people are more likely
to put higher weight on a perfectly predictive cue, and less
weight on other cues, when learning is intentional rather
than incidental. It is possible that intentional learning in-
structions made Hutchinson and Alba’s (1991) criterion out-
come the focus of prediction, making learning about this
outcome more adaptive and more directed toward optimal
prediction. This may have led subjects to place more weight
on the critical cue and less on the other cues. In contrast,
under incidental learning instructions, the main outcome
may not have been the focus of prediction. In that case,
consumers are less geared toward optimal prediction, lead-
ing to weights that are less dependent on a cue’s critical
contribution to optimal prediction. However, we note that
Hutchinson and Alba’s (1991) result can be explained in a
number of ways that are consistent with both types of learn-
ing. For example, both classes of models would predict that
the association strengths of perfectly predictive cues are
more similar to those of imperfectly predictive cues if in-
cidental learning is slower than intentional learning.
In sum, we believe that consumers’ predictive product
judgments are also influenced by an associative learning
process that is qualitatively different from adaptive learning.
This process is backward looking—instead of the activation
of cues leading directly to judgments or predictions of out-
comes, judgments made using the HAM system rely on
associative retrieval of information about how often stimulus
elements have occurred together in the past. In addition,
during learning, the process does not require consumers to
focus on predicting specific stimulus elements. Finally, be-
cause learning in this system is based on basic co-occurrence
instead of a weighted additive prediction rule and error min-
imization, we believe that this learning should not be char-
acterized by cue interaction. Thus, we expect that consum-
ers’ product judgments will show cue interaction and will
be consistent with adaptive network models for outcomes
that are the focus of prediction during learning. We expect
that product judgments will show cue independence and will
be consistent with HAM models for outcomes that are not
the focus of prediction during learning. Study 1 examines
this hypothesis in a scenario with two outcomes by in-
structing subjects to focus on predicting one of the
outcomes.
STUDY 1
If adaptive learning is contingent on an outcome being
the focus of prediction during learning, then it should be
possible to encourage consumers to engage in adaptive
learning or HAM learning about relationships between brand
names and consumption outcomes by varying the focus of
prediction during learning. Subjects were asked to taste and
rate a series of six cake samples that varied both in the
intensity of their chocolate flavor and the degree of their
moistness. In addition to receiving information about flavor
and moistness, subjects also received information about each
product’s family brand name and, in some cases, an ingre-
dient brand name. The pairing between the brand name(s)
and the outcomes (flavor and moistness) was manipulated
to allow us to draw inferences about the nature of the as-
sociative learning process between ingredient brand names
and each of the two outcomes. One-half of the subjects were
encouraged to focus on learning to predict the flavor benefit
by having them rate the chocolate flavor of the sample,
whereas the other half of the subjects were encouraged to
focus on learning to predict the moistness benefit by having
them rate the moistness of the sample. Subsequently, sub-
jects were asked to predict the flavor and the moistness of
a muffin that had ingredient brand name I1 or I2.
The key dependent measure was the association between
the ingredient brand names and chocolate flavor. It was ex-
pected that the flavor-focused subjects should engage in
adaptive learning of the flavor association as evidenced by
cue interaction effects in the associations between the in-
gredient brand names and chocolate flavor. In contrast, the
moistness-focused subjects should engage in HAM learning
of the flavor association, as evidenced by cue independence
of the associations between the ingredient brand names and
chocolate flavor.
Design and Predictions
The study was a two-cell, within-subject design (ingre-
dient brand name that uniquely predicts the target benefit),
with a between-subject manipulation of the focus of pre-
diction during learning (target benefit, distracter benefit) and
an ingredient brand name counterbalancing factor (see App.
B, Tables B1, B2, and B3, for design summaries of this and
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FIGURE 1
PREDICTIONS AND RESULTS OF STUDY 1
the following studies). Subjects were exposed to an L, F1,
F1I1, F2, F2I2, F2I2 sequence of product experiences in which
L represented a low-quality baseline brand, F1 and F2 rep-
resented family brand names (e.g., Delight, Buon Choco-
late), and I1 and I2 represented ingredient brand names (e.g.,
Baker’s Blend Syrup, Silk’n Morsels). The cakes differed
in their moistness and chocolate flavor. The L and F1 cakes
had a mild chocolate taste. The other cakes had a strong
chocolate taste. The L and F2 cakes tasted dry, whereas the
other cakes tasted moist.
According to the HAM models, I2 should have a stronger
association with strong chocolate flavor than I1, because I2
was experienced together with strong chocolate flavor twice
whereas I1 had only been paired with strong chocolate flavor
once (see Fig. 1 and App. C). Adaptive learning models
predict the opposite result. Cake I1 should have a stronger
association with strong chocolate flavor than I2 because of
an unblocking effect (Rescorla and Wagner 1972; Shanks
1991) for I1 and a blocking effect (Kamin 1969) for I2.
According to the adaptive learning models, the I1 cue (e.g.,
Baker’s Blend Syrup) will form a strong association with
strong chocolate flavor whereas the I2 cue (e.g., Silk ’n
Morsels) will not, despite the fact that both ingredient brand
names are presented with strong chocolate flavor (see Fig.
1 and App. C). This is the case because the ingredient brand
name uniquely identifies strong chocolate flavor in the first
product line but is a redundant predictor for strong chocolate
flavor in the second product line (the strong chocolate flavor
is already predicted by the family brand name F2).
The two classes of models do not make competing pre-
dictions about the association strength between the two in-
gredient brand names and the moistness benefit. The HAM
models predict that I2 will be perceived as moister than I1
because I2 is presented with moist cake twice and I1 is pre-
sented with moist cake once. The adaptive network models
predict that I2 will be perceived as moister than I1 because
I2 uniquely identifies moist taste whereas I1 is a redundant
predictor. Nonetheless, the moistness manipulation was in-
cluded because subjects in the distraction condition needed
to attend to a consumption outcome with variance.
Procedure and Stimulus Materials
Subjects participated in a taste test experiment in which
they were asked to rate a series of six cake samples. Subjects
were given a questionnaire, the first page consisting of an
explanation of the task. Turning to page 2, subjects were
asked to taste and rate the first sample on one of two 10-
point scales, with end points labeled dry/extra-moist and
mild chocolate flavor/strong chocolate flavor. They first
tasted the L cake sample labeled Treats. The questionnaire
informed them that the Treats cake was the lowest quality
sample that they would taste and that it should be rated a
“1” on the scale. Subjects were told that the rating of the
five remaining cake samples should be made relative to this
baseline.
The subjects then tasted the remaining five cake samples
and were asked to rate the intensity of the chocolate flavor
or the moistness of each sample. Each of the five remaining
cake samples had been labeled with brand/branded ingre-
dient information. Each cake sample was also identified with
brand/branded ingredient information in the questionnaire.
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Subjects were asked to check the product label prior to
tasting the cake sample to confirm that they were tasting
the correct sample. This instruction increased the salience
of the brand and branded ingredient information. Subjects
ate an unsalted soda cracker and had a drink of water in
between each of the five product taste tests. Subjects always
rated the current sample prior to tasting the next sample.
The mild, dry baseline L sample was created by taking
a store brand chocolate cake, replacing one-half of the mix
with white cake mix, and then air-drying the baked cake for
24 hours. The mild, moist F1 sample was created by taking
a chocolate cake mix (e.g., Betty Crocker Super Moist Fudge
Chocolate) and replacing one-half of the mix with white
cake mix (e.g., Betty Crocker Super Moist White). The fla-
vorful moist F1I1 sample was the unaltered chocolate cake
mix (e.g., Betty Crocker Super Moist Fudge Chocolate). The
flavorful, dry F2 sample was a base chocolate cake mix (e.g.,
Betty Crocker Supreme Chocolate), with an extra cup of
chopped chocolate chips that was then air dried for 24 hours.
Pretesting showed that dry samples were perceived to have
less chocolate flavor than moist samples, so chocolate chips
were added to compensate for the dryness. These chips were
not noticeable in the baked product. The flavorful, moist
F2I2 sample was the same base chocolate cake mix as the
F2 cake mix (e.g., Betty Crocker Supreme Chocolate) but
without the chocolate chips or drying. The second flavorful,
moist F2I2 sample was a fudge cake (e.g., Betty Crocker
Super Moist with Creamy Swirls of Fudge Chocolate). The
second F2I2 sample was not the same sample as the first,
because it would have seen odd to our subjects to taste the
same thing twice. However, any differences between the two
samples beyond their chocolate flavor and moistness do not
affect the predictions for either class of learning models.
The Baker’s Blend Syrup and Silk’n Morsels ingredient
brand names assigned to I1 and I2 were counterbalanced.
After tasting all of the samples, the sample wrappers and
labels were collected for disposal. Subjects were then asked
to turn the page and report their expectations about the
chocolate flavor and the moistness of a muffin made with
each ingredient brand (I1 and I2). Subjects used 10-point
scales to report how likely it would be that a Muffin Man
muffin made with Baker’s Blend Syrup (F3I1) would have
a strong chocolate flavor, how likely it would be that a
Muffin Man muffin made with Silk’n Morsels (F3I2) would
have a strong chocolate flavor, how likely it would be that
a Muffin Man muffin made with Baker’s Blend Syrup (F3I1)
would taste moist, and how likely it would be that a Muffin
Man muffin made with Silk’n Morsels (F3I2) would taste
moist. The F3I1 and the F3I2 chocolate flavor dependent mea-
sures were counterbalanced but always were the first two
of the four judgments.
Results
Fifty-nine subjects from an introductory marketing class
were awarded extra credit to participate in the study. The
expectation about the intensity of the chocolate flavor of the
ingredient branded muffin was used as an indicator of the
association strength between each ingredient brand name
and flavor. There was no influence of the ingredient brand
name counterbalancing factor or the dependent measure or-
der counterbalancing factor on the flavor ratings (all p’s 1
)..10
Manipulation Check. Subjects who rated the flavor of
the samples perceived the F1 sample to have less chocolate
flavor than the F1I1 sample ( )F(1, 28)p 201.75, p ! .05
and the F2, F2I2, F2I2 samples to have equivalent chocolate
flavor ( ). Subjects who rated theF(2, 26)p 1.23, p 1 .10
moistness of the samples perceived the F1 sample to be as
moist as the F1I1 sample ( ) and theF(1, 28)p 0.17, p 1 .10
F2 sample to be drier than the F2I2 and F2I2 samples
( ). Thus, the manipulation of theF(2, 27)p 31.98, p ! .05
two taste dimensions was successful.
Associations with Ingredient Brand Names. Figure
1 shows the degree of association between I1 and I2 with
chocolate flavor by condition. The interaction of the focus
of prediction during the learning phase (i.e., focus on flavor
vs. focus on moistness) and the amount of chocolate flavor
associated with the ingredient brand names, I1 and I2, was
significant ( ). When subjects wereF(1, 26)p 8.06, p ! .05
asked to rate the chocolate flavor intensity of the samples
during the learning phase, I1 was perceived as a better pre-
dictor of the chocolate flavor than I2 (M pF I3 1
, a finding7.76, M p 6.90, F(1, 27)p 4.06, pp .05)F I3 2
consistent with the predictions of the adaptive network mod-
els. When subjects were asked to rate the moistness of the
samples during the taste test, I2 was perceived as a better
predictor of chocolate flavor than I1 (M pF I3 1), a finding6.50, M p 7.47, F(1, 28)p 4.11, pp .05F I3 2
consistent with the HAM models. Subjects also perceived
a muffin made with I2 ( ) would be moister thanM p 7.25F I3 2
a muffin made with I1 (M p 6.30, F(1, 55)pF I3 1), a result that is consistent with adaptive30.98, pp .05
network and HAM models.
Discussion
In study 1, people were encouraged to focus on predicting
either the flavor or the moistness of cakes. As expected, a
predictive focus on the chocolate flavor of the samples led
to adaptive learning of associations between the brand names
and the flavor of the products, whereas a predictive focus
on the moistness of the samples led to HAM learning for
the associations between brand names and flavor. Thus,
study 1 shows that consumer learning of brand-benefit as-
sociations and subsequent product judgments are not nec-
essarily subject to cue interaction. This result suggests that
consumers have two different ways of learning product as-
sociations that can influence product judgments, one con-
sistent with HAM models of associative learning and mem-
ory and one consistent with adaptive network models.
The results of study 1 suggest that the focus of prediction
is a critical determinant of which type of associations drive
judgments. Yet, it is possible that people focused on both
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benefit outcomes but could not learn adaptively about more
than one outcome at a time. This alternative hypothesis is
consistent with the surprising fact that we are not aware of
any published data showing adaptive learning with stimuli
that consist of both multiple cues and multiple outcomes.
Thus, the finding that adaptive learning was limited to the
benefit that was the focus of attention may have been a
constraint of the learning system, not a consequence of the
predictive focus only. If being the focus of prediction is the
critical factor that drives adaptive learning, then it should
be possible to find evidence for adaptive learning if con-
sumers focus on two outcomes during learning.
STUDY 2
Study 2 was designed to test the hypothesis that adaptive
learning can occur for two outcomes when both are the focus
of prediction during learning. To the extent consumers can
learn adaptively about more than one outcome, the hypoth-
esis that adaptive learning is not limited to a single outcome,
but critically depends on predictive focus, would be further
supported.
Design and Predictions
The study was a 2 (ingredient brand name that uniquely
predicts target benefit one) by 2 (ingredient brand name that
uniquely predicts target benefit two) within-subject design
with a between-subject manipulation of the ingredient brand/
consumption outcome combination receiving the greater
number of pairings (see App. B). The design also included
an ingredient brand name counterbalancing factor and a de-
pendent measure order counterbalancing factor.
The same cake samples and dependent measures were
used as in study 1. The learning sequence in condition 1
was identical to the learning sequence experienced in study
1. Thus, in condition 1, subjects experienced a mild choc-
olate-flavored piece of cake F1, followed by strong choco-
late-flavored cakes F1I1, F2, F2I2, and F2I2. In this condition,
the HAM models predict that I2 should be more strongly
associated with the chocolate flavor, whereas the adaptive
network models predicts a stronger association of I1 with
the chocolate flavor (see Fig. 2). The same series of samples
also varied with respect to moistness. The F1 and F1I1 sam-
ples were moist, followed by a dry piece of cake F2 and
moist pieces of cake F2I2 and F2I2. Both classes of models
predict that I2 should become more strongly associated with
moistness (see Fig. 2).
To show that people can engage in the adaptive learning
of two benefits, we needed a second condition, because any
one condition can only differentiate between two types of
learning for a single benefit. In condition 2, subjects ex-
perienced a mild chocolate-flavored piece of cake F1 and
then strong chocolate-flavored cakes F1I1, F1I1, F2, and F2I2.
In this learning scenario, both models predict that I1 becomes
more associated with the chocolate flavor (see Fig. 2). The
same pieces of cake also varied in terms of moistness. The
F1, F1I1, and F1I1 samples were moist pieces of cake, fol-
lowed by a dry piece of cake F2 and a moist piece of cake
F2I2. The HAM models predicts that I1 will be more strongly
associated with moistness, whereas the adaptive network
models predict that I2 will be more strongly associated with
moistness. All subjects were asked to rate both the chocolate
flavor and the moistness of the samples during the taste test,
encouraging subjects to predict both benefits during
learning.
Results
Fifty-eight subjects from an introductory marketing class
were awarded extra credit to participate in the study. The
expectation about the intensity of the chocolate flavor of the
ingredient-branded muffin was used as an indicator of the
association strength between each ingredient brand name
and flavor. The expectation about the moistness of the in-
gredient-branded muffin was used as an indicator of the
association strength between each ingredient brand name
and moistness. There was no influence of the sample rating
question order counterbalancing factor for either dependent
measure in either condition (all ). There was nop’s 1 .10
influence of the ingredient brand name counterbalancing
factor for either dependent measure in either condition (all
).p’s 1 .10
Manipulation Check. In condition 1, subjects per-
ceived the F1 sample to have less chocolate flavor than the
F1I1 sample ( ) and perceived theF(1, 27)p 76.54, p ! .05
F2, F2I2, and F2I2 samples to have equivalent chocolate flavor
( ). In condition 2, subjects per-F(2, 25)p 1.59, p 1 .10
ceived the F1 sample to have less chocolate flavor than the
F1I1 and F1I1 samples ( ) and per-F(1, 29)p 16.79, p ! .05
ceived the F2 and F2I2 samples to have equivalent chocolate
flavor ( ). In condition 1, subjectsF(1, 28)p 0.68, p 1 .10
perceived the F1 and F1I1 samples to have equivalent moist-
ness ( ) and percieved the F2 sam-F(1, 26)p 0.54, p 1 .10
ple to be drier than the F2I2 and F2I2 samples (F(1, 27)p
). In condition 2, subjects perceived the F1 to13.80, p ! .05
be moister than both F1I1 samples (F(2, 27)p 6.21, p !
) and perceived the F2 sample to be drier than the F2I2.05
sample ( ). The finding that F1 wasF(1, 29)p 58.89, p ! .05
moister than both F1I1 samples in condition 2 was unex-
pected, but the higher moistness for the F1 sample did not
affect the directional predictions of either class of learning
models. For the cue-independent HAM models, the moist-
ness of a sample that does not include an ingredient brand
does not affect that ingredient brand’s associations. For
adaptive network models, the fact that the F1 sample is
moister than the F1I1 sample makes I1 even less of an in-
dicator of high moistness than if both samples were equally
moist, which is perfectly consistent with the prediction that
I1 has a weaker association with moistness than I2.
Associations with Ingredient Brand Names. Figure
3 shows the degree of association of I1 and I2 with chocolate
flavor and moistness by condition. In condition 1, I1 was
perceived as a better predictor of chocolate flavor than I2
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( ), aM p 7.68, M p 6.32, F(1, 24)p 5.80, p ! .05F I F I3 1 3 2
finding consistent with the adaptive network models but not
HAM models. In condition 1, I2 was perceived as a better
predictor of moistness than I1 (M p 6.25, M pF I F I3 1 3 2), a finding consistent with7.68, F(1, 24)p 4.33, p ! .05
both classes of models. In condition 2, I1 was perceived as
a better predictor of chocolate flavor than I2 (M pF I3 1), a finding7.10, M p 5.90, F(1, 26)p 8.20, p ! .05F I3 2
consistent with both classes of models. In condition 2, I2
was perceived as a better predictor of moistness than I1
( ), aM p 5.77, M p 6.67, F(1, 26)p 3.59, p ! .07F I F I3 1 3 2
finding consistent with the adaptive network models but not
the HAM models.
Discussion
In study 2, subjects were encouraged to focus on two
consumption benefits during the tasting of the product sam-
ples. Unlike study 1, cue interaction was found for both
outcomes in study 2. These results confirm the hypothesis
that when consumers are encouraged to focus on more than
one outcome during learning, they are able to engage in
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adaptive learning about more than one outcome. The results
disconfirm the hypothesis that the adaptive learning system
is constrained to learning about a single outcome.
Studies 1 and 2 support the hypothesis that adaptive learn-
ing is found only when an outcome is the focus of prediction.
Yet, these studies do not provide insight into the factors that
make an outcome the focus of prediction. One possibility
is that active, adaptive learning accompanies any explicit
learning goal, whereas HAM learning accompanies any im-
plicit learning goal. In other words, consumers engage in
adaptive learning when they pay attention to an outcome
but engage in HAM learning when they do not pay attention
to an outcome. A second possibility is that adaptive learning
accompanies any explicit learning goal about an outcome
that is significant or worthy of prediction. In other words,
an outcome must (1) receive attention and (2) be significant
enough to become the focus of prediction during learning.
These competing hypotheses are the subject of study 3.
STUDY 3
In study 3, we tested the hypotheses that adaptive learning
only occurs when consumers are motivated to predict an
outcome and that the motivation to predict an outcome is
not a consequence of simply paying attention. We believe
that consumers will be most motivated to learn to predict
outcomes that they perceive to have hedonic relevance—that
is, outcomes that are seen to have rewarding or punishing
implications. Associates that are characteristics of the con-
sumption experience itself, such as taste experiences, will
often be seen to have direct hedonic relevance, and paying
explicit attention to them will likely be sufficient for them
to become the focus of prediction during learning. In con-
trast, associates that are characteristics of the product will
not have any direct hedonic relevance, and merely paying
attention to them will not be sufficient to make them become
the focus of prediction during learning. For those associates
to become significant enough to be the focus of prediction,
they would have to be linked to hedonically relevant char-
acteristics of the consumption experience that are the focus
of prediction. Thus, we predict that paying explicit attention
to an outcome is not sufficient for adaptive learning to occur
but that outcomes also need to be hedonically relevant, either
directly or indirectly, by being a proxy for another outcome
that is the focus of prediction.
To test whether paying explicit attention was a sufficient
condition for adaptive learning, we needed to manipulate
the perceived hedonic relevance of an associate without add-
ing confounding factors. One possible solution was to add
a third associate that was not directly hedonically relevant
but that could be varied with respect to indirect perceived
hedonic relevance. Our third associate was the type of cocoa
used in the cake mix. The type of cocoa in a cake mix
(natural or Dutch cocoa) should have little hedonic relevance
when the subjects first come to the experiment. Still, it is
possible to make type of cocoa hedonically relevant indi-
rectly, without changing other aspects of the stimuli. This
could be done by making sure that the hedonically irrelevant
associate (type of cocoa) was perfectly correlated with an-
other, hedonically relevant associate (chocolate flavor) and
by instructing subjects to focus either on that hedonically
relevant associate or on a third associate (moistness). Only
in the first case would subjects be sufficiently motivated to
make the associate that was initially hedonically less rele-
vant (type of cocoa) the focus of prediction during learning.
Thus, when chocolate flavor is itself the focus of prediction,
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type of cocoa would function as a proxy for a focal he-
donically relevant outcome and would itself be learned adap-
tively. When chocolate flavor is not the focus of prediction
during learning, type of cocoa would be, at most, a proxy
for a nonfocal outcome, and HAM learning would occur.
Design and Predictions
In study 3, we added the type of cocoa ingredient infor-
mation to the labels used to identify the cake samples, using
a design otherwise identical to study 1 (see App. B). Mild
chocolate flavor samples were labeled as having natural co-
coa, and strong chocolate flavor samples were labeled as
having Dutch cocoa. Like study 1, one-half of the subjects
were asked to assess the moistness of the samples and the
other half of the subjects were asked to assess the flavor of
the samples. In addition, all subjects were asked to indicate
whether the sample had Dutch cocoa or natural cocoa. Thus,
one-half of the subjects were asked to rate the presence or
absence of the associate that had little direct hedonic rele-
vance (Dutch cocoa) and the presence or absence of the
related, hedonically relevant associate (strong chocolate fla-
vor). The other half of the subjects were asked to rate the
presence or absence of the associate that had little direct
hedonic relevance (Dutch cocoa) and the presence or ab-
sence of the unrelated, hedonically relevant associate (high
moistness). The ingredient labels were counterbalanced.
At test, subjects were told that a muffin manufacturer
believed that people preferred a product with Dutch cocoa,
and, based on their experiences, they should indicate which
ingredient brand they most associated with Dutch cocoa.
Subjects were asked to indicate, “Which ingredient (e.g.,
Baker’s Blend chocolate syrup vs. Silk’n Morsels chocolate
bits) is made with real Dutch cocoa?” by circling the ap-
propriate brand name. If paying explicit attention to an out-
come and recording its level are sufficient to make an out-
come the object of an adaptive learning process, then
subjects should show cue interaction in both conditions. If,
in addition to paying attention to an outcome, the outcome
must be hedonically relevant, either directly or indirectly,
in order for the outcome to become the object of an adaptive
learning process, then subjects should show cue interaction
only when they were asked to rate chocolate flavor of the
samples. In the moistness rating condition, chocolate flavor
should remain hedonically irrelevant and should not become
the focus of predictive learning; hence, no cue interaction
should be observed.
Results
One hundred thirty-five subjects from an introductory
marketing class were awarded extra credit to participate in
the study. The key dependent measure was the subjects’
choice of I1 or I2 as the brand they associated most with
Dutch cocoa. Figure 4 shows the number of subjects se-
lecting I1 or I2 as the brand made with Dutch cocoa when
they had also judged flavor or moistness. The overall test
for an interaction between benefit judged during learning
(flavor, moistness) and the brand chosen was significant
( ). Subjects who judged flavor inten-2x (1)p 7.13, p ! .05
sity and the type of cocoa attribute during the learning phase
were more likely to select I1 as the brand made with Dutch
cocoa ( ), a2N p 42, N p 27, x (1)p 3.26, pp .07F I F I3 1 3 2
finding consistent with the adaptive network models but not
the HAM models. Subjects who judged moistness and the
type of cocoa attribute during the learning phase were more
likely to select I2 as the brand made with Dutch cocoa
( ), a finding2N p 25, N p 41, x (1)p 3.87, p ! .05F I F I3 1 3 2
consistent with the HAM models but not the adaptive net-
work models.
Discussion
Study 3 supports the view that adaptive learning only
occurs when consumers are motivated to make an outcome
the focus of prediction during learning. When an associate
that had little direct hedonic relevance (type of cocoa) be-
came a clear proxy of a focal, hedonically relevant outcome
(chocolate flavor), it became the focus of prediction and
associations were learned adaptively, in accordance with the
adaptive network models. When an associate that had little
direct hedonic relevance (type of cocoa) was not a proxy
of a focal, hedonically relevant outcome (chocolate flavor),
the originally nonvalenced attribute did not become the fo-
cus of prediction and associations were learned in accor-
dance with the HAM learning models. Thus, this study pro-
vides further evidence that adaptive learning and cue
interaction require that associates become the focus of pre-
diction during learning. Adaptive learning does not occur
any time that associates are consciously attended and con-
sidered. Instead, adaptive learning occurs when an attended
outcome is motivationally significant enough to make it the
focus of prediction.
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The presence of cue interaction when consumers focus
on a hedonically relevant associate as an outcome to be
predicted, a finding consistent with adaptive network mod-
els, and of cue independence when consumers do not try
to learn to predict an associate, a finding consistent with
HAM models, suggests that consumers use two different
learning processes to form product associations. However,
the presence or absence of cue interaction should not be the
only difference between the two ways of learning associa-
tions that can be used to judge products. For example, in
our description of the two processes, we proposed that judg-
ing products using adaptive associations is a forward-look-
ing process and that judging products using HAM associ-
ations is a backward-looking process. If this is indeed the
case, then it should be possible to change judgments by
manipulating the evaluation strategies at the time of judg-
ment, which is the main purpose of study 4.
STUDY 4
In study 4, we directly assess the forward-looking versus
backward-looking nature of the two processes by instructing
some subjects to try to recall individual experiences prior
to predicting the quality of products. We also make a number
of small changes in the procedure to handle potential crit-
icisms of the first three studies. First, we use a nonexper-
iential outcome to ensure that adaptive learning is not limited
to benefits that are directly experienced. Second, we directly
measure the strength of associations during an initial learn-
ing phase to ensure that assumptions about learning of F1-
outcome and F2-outcome associations are appropriate. In the
first studies, some parameter configurations exist that could
theoretically allow some versions of adaptive network mod-
els, such as Pearce’s (1994) configural model, to account
for the pattern of results (if the specification of the model
is changed to allow learning parameters to vary for every
cue-outcome combination). Even though these parameter
values would have to be unusually low in some conditions,
and quite varied across the first three studies, showing that
HAM learning occurs even when the family brand name
association to the target outcome reached an asymptote prior
to the presentation of family/ingredient brand trials would
provide irrefutable evidence against a complete explanation
in terms of the adaptive network models. In addition to
asymptotic family brand learning, irrefutable evidence in
support of the two-process theory could also be obtained
by showing two different types of learning after an identical
set of learning trials. Logically, no single model can ever
predict different learning results between two conditions if
the learning part of the experiment is identical for both
conditions. Thus, this study strongly challenges the ability
of any one-process theory to explain how consumers learn
product associations and use them to make predictions and
evaluations.
Design and Procedure
The study was a two-cell, within-subject design (ingre-
dient brand name that uniquely predicts the target benefit)
with a between-subject instruction manipulation (no instruc-
tion, backward-looking instruction) and a brand name coun-
terbalancing factor. The basic design was similar to study
1 but included an initial learning phase in which the F1 and
F2 associations with the focal outcome were learned up to
asymptote. The symbols F1 and F2 represented family brand
names (e.g., Delight, Buon Chocolate). Outcome informa-
tion was limited to a single benefit, mild or strong chocolate
flavor.
Subjects participated in a computerized learning experi-
ment in groups of up to 12 persons. On the first computer
screen, subjects were instructed that they were to learn to
predict the chocolate flavor of cakes. On the next four
screens, they were presented with a brand name and asked
to anticipate the flavor intensity of the brand by selecting a
scale item labeled “mild chocolate flavor,” “average choc-
olate flavor,” or “strong chocolate flavor.” Then, subjects
were given feedback on the flavor of the sample using the
schedule F1/mild chocolate flavor, F2/strong chocolate flavor,
F1/mild chocolate flavor, and F2/strong chocolate flavor. Af-
ter receiving the four product descriptions, subjects were
asked to rate explicitly the likelihood that a product carrying
the F1 brand would have a strong chocolate flavor using an
11-point scale, with end points labeled “mild chocolate fla-
vor” and “strong chocolate flavor.” The same question was
asked about the F2 brand. If subjects did not select one of
the two lowest scale values for the F1 brand and the highest
two scale values for the F2 brand, they were given four
additional trials. This procedure was repeated until subjects
selected the appropriate extreme scale values or until they
perfectly predicted the outcomes on the four most recent
trials.
After the subjects reached asymptotic learning for both
family brands, they were presented with a series of new
products. The sequence they experienced was F1, F1I1, F2,
F2I2, F2I2. The symbols I1 and I2 represented ingredient brand
names (e.g., Baker’s Blend Syrup, Silk’n Morsels). All but
the F1 product were described as having a strong chocolate
flavor. Next, subjects were asked to rate the likelihood that
a new brand of muffin with each ingredient brand (F3I1 and
F3I2) would have a strong chocolate flavor, using a 100-point
scale with end points labeled “The muffin with Baker’s
Blend Syrup will have the strongest chocolate flavor” and
“The muffin with Silk’n Morsels will have the strongest
chocolate flavor.” Right before answering this question, the
subjects in the backward-looking condition were asked to
think back and recall the product descriptions that they had
seen in order to determine how likely the product would be
to have a strong chocolate flavor. The other half of the
subjects were not given the backward-looking instruction.
Thus, the manipulation took place after learning but before
the collection of the dependent measures. Therefore, no
learning parameter differences could exist between the con-
214 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
FIGURE 5
RESULTS OF STUDY 4
ditions. We also note that there was a F2, F2I2, F2I2, F1, F1I1
order counterbalancing sequence for the stimuli.
We assume that, because adaptive learning is a more fo-
cused, motivationally guided process, consumers will spon-
taneously use adaptive associations to make predictions
whenever adaptive associations are available. Because HAM
learning always associates all elements of an experience,
we assume that HAM associations will only guide predic-
tions when either no adaptive associations are available or
external factors (such as explicit instructions) encourage the
use of HAM associations over adaptive associations. Thus,
we predict that cue independence will occur when consum-
ers are asked to retrospect and that cue interaction will occur
when consumers are not asked to retrospect. According to
the HAM models, I2 should have a stronger association with
strong chocolate flavor than does I1, because I2 was paired
with strong chocolate flavor two times, whereas I1 was
paired with the strong chocolate flavor once (see predicted
strength of association graph in Fig. 1). According to adap-
tive network models, the I1 cue will form a stronger asso-
ciation with strong chocolate flavor than the I2 cue because
the ingredient brand name uniquely identifies strong choc-
olate flavor in the first product line but is a redundant pre-
dictor for strong chocolate flavor in the second product line
(see predicted strength of association graph in Fig. 1).
Results
Forty subjects from an introductory marketing class were
awarded extra credit to participate in the study. The expec-
tation about the intensity of the chocolate flavor of the in-
gredient-branded muffin was used as an indicator of the
association strength between each ingredient brand name
and flavor. There was no influence of the counterbalancing
factor ( ).F(1, 37)p 0.04, p 1 .10
Manipulation Check. All of the subjects reached as-
ymptotic learning. Fifty-five percent of the subjects judged
an F1 product to be very unlikely to have a strong chocolate
flavor and an F2 product to be very likely to have a strong
chocolate flavor. The remaining 45 percent of the subjects
were not as extreme in their judgments but did correctly
predict the flavor outcome in their last four asymptotic learn-
ing trials. There was no interaction between this indicator
of asymptotic learning and the dependent measure
( ), implying that differences inF(1, 37)p 0.34, p 1 .10
first-phase learning of the family brand associations could
not account for the results on the dependent measure and
again suggesting that all subjects had learned to asymptote.
Associations with Ingredient Brand Names. Figure
5 shows the degree of association between I1 and I2, with
chocolate flavor by condition. The backward-looking in-
struction significantly influenced the reported association
between the ingredient brand names and moistness
( ). In the no instruction condition,F(1, 37)p 5.31, p ! .05
I1 was perceived as a better predictor of chocolate flavor
than I2 ( , one-tail test against the scale indifferenceMp 38.9
point of 50, ), a finding consistentF(1, 37)p 2.89, p ! .05
with adaptive network models, but not the HAM models.
In the backward-looking condition, I2 was perceived as a
better predictor of chocolate flavor than I1 ( , one-Mp 62.2
tail test against the scale indifference point of 50,
), a finding consistent with theF(1, 37)p 3.20, p ! .05
HAM models, but not the adaptive network models.
Discussion
Results in study 4 provide direct support for a critical
process-assumption of our two-process theory. In a situation
in which all subjects should have formed adaptive associ-
ations in addition to HAM associations, subjects using a
forward-looking judgment process showed cue interaction,
but subjects using a backward-looking judgment process
showed cue independence. In addition, the outcome was not
experiential, suggesting adaptive learning can occur in con-
texts that have nonexperiential outcomes as the focus of
prediction. Thus, our data again suggest that both classes
of models have merit.
This finding conceptually replicates van Osselaer and
Alba’s (2000) experiment 2A. However, their experiment
was designed merely to disconfirm a purely attentional ex-
planation of the blocking effect. Unsurprisingly, it had de-
sign limitations that made it unsuitable as a test of the back-
ward-looking, cue-independent learning hypothesis. First,
van Osselaer and Alba asked subjects to write down the
frequencies of co-occurrence between the to-be-blocked cue
and the outcome. This recording task highlighted the fact
that the frequencies for the to-be-blocked cue were as high
as those for the blocking cue. Van Osselaer and Alba (2000)
mention that this procedure might easily lead to a consis-
tency-in-responding bias in which subjects try to avoid ap-
pearing inconsistent to the experimenter by assigning no
weight to the blocked cue in the immediately following
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prediction task. In our experiment, we do not ask subjects
to compute and record frequencies, and subjects give only
one response, the predictive response. Thus, no consistency
in responding bias can occur. Second, in van Osselaer and
Alba’s (2000) experiment, the backward-looking instruction
merely reduced the blocking effect, which could result from
several factors such as the extra delay between learning and
predictive judgment in the backward-looking condition. In
our experiment, the difference between adaptive learning
and HAM learning in forward and backward learning con-
texts is supported with a true judgment reversal that cannot
be explained by a mere weakening of adaptive associations
over time.
The results also disconfirm the possibility that all of the
results in the first three studies can be explained by an
adaptive network model that assumes very low learning
parameters for the family brands in some conditions. Al-
gebraic analysis and systematic parameter search simula-
tions of study 4 show that there exists no set of parameter
settings that can make the LMS or Pearce models fit the
cue-independent result under asymptotic learning of family
brand associations. In addition, both groups in study 4 re-
ceived exactly the same learning treatment. Therefore, both
groups learned the same way, with exactly the same set of
learning parameters. Logically, no model can predict two
different results with a single parameter setting. Thus, both
the asymptotic learning aspect and the fact that learning
itself was not manipulated bolster the claim that the results
cannot be the result of any one process.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Understanding how consumers learn product associations
is important for researchers seeking to understand how con-
sumers evaluate products and make choices. Research in
psychology and consumer behavior has recently suggested
that the associations people use to make product evaluations,
predictions, and choices are the result of an adaptive learning
process characterized by cue interaction (e.g., Janiszewski
and van Osselaer 2000; Pearce 1994; Shanks et al. 1996).
The findings of cue interaction in the studies suggested that
the HAM models that have traditionally guided consumer
research on brand associations are either incomplete or in-
correct. We find that consumers have two associative learn-
ing processes at their disposal that can guide product eval-
uations, predictions, and choices.
We have also proposed a more detailed theory specifying
the qualitative differences between the two processes and
have started to test it empirically. Our data support findings
by van Osselaer and Alba (2000) showing that cue inter-
action is the result of a forward-looking process and extend
them significantly by showing that the other, cue-indepen-
dent process is inherently backward looking. In addition to
showing that there are two learning systems that can be used
to make predictive judgments and illustrating that the second
process is cue independent and backward looking, we in-
vestigate factors that determine which process guides be-
havior. Our results show that adaptive learning drives out-
come predictions only when the outcome is the focus of
prediction during learning. We find that merely paying at-
tention to an outcome is not sufficient for that outcome to
become the focus of prediction during learning. Study 3
shows that even when an outcome is explicitly attended to,
HAM learning will drive predictions unless the outcome is
perceived to be hedonically relevant. Thus, it seems that
adaptive learning is restricted to outcomes that are moti-
vationally significant.
It is important to note that the predictions tested in our
studies are not specific to the four models discussed here.
These models are merely representatives of their respective
classes of models, chosen because they are the most current,
prototypical, and empirically supported in their respective
literatures. For example, adaptive network models that we
have not discussed, including Attention Learning COVEring
Map (ALCOVE; Kruschke 1992), Attention to Distinctive
InpuT (ADIT; Kruschke 1996), and Rapid Attention SHifts
’N’ Learning (RASHNL; Kruschke and Johansen 1999), use
learning rules that have the same basic characteristics of
error minimization and additivity that characterize the con-
figural and LMS models. Thus, the strong theory tests in
our studies investigate the predictions of two classes of mod-
els, as opposed to the predictions of specific models.
It is also important to recognize that the proposed two-
process theory has the potential to provide insights into why
different learning goals and/or outcomes promote HAM
learning or adaptive learning in a variety of contexts. For
example, learning can be incidental or intentional, nonex-
periential or experiential, about nonvalenced attributes or
valenced benefits, and about beliefs or attitudes. To the ex-
tent that learning involves outcomes that are more moti-
vationally significant because they are very salient or more
closely related to the actual consumption experience, adap-
tive learning should occur.
Finally, it is important to note that the findings presented
here have important managerial implications. Whenever
consumers use the HAM learning system, brand equity will
to a large extent depend on the frequency with which brand
names are accompanied by positive consumption experi-
ences. This implies, for example, that adding a well-known
ingredient brand name to a well-known product without
changing its quality will strengthen ingredient brand asso-
ciations to quality. In contrast, whenever consumers use the
adaptive learning system, the equity of a brand name will
depend on what consumers learn about other features of the
product. For example, if the adaptive system governs con-
sumers’ behavior, adding a well-known ingredient brand
name to a well-known product without changing its quality
will often weaken the ingredient brand association to quality
because of an overexpectation effect (Janiszewski and van
Osselaer 2000).
Limitations and Future Research
Together with previous work by consumer researchers,
these results provide insight into how consumer learning
affects product evaluation and choice. However, the litera-
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ture on consumer learning and evaluation is still small, and
many questions remain unanswered. The empirical studies
reported here cover only a few of the many testable impli-
cations of a learning theory that incorporates both HAM
learning and adaptive learning. For example, we have not
explored the validity of the supposed shortsightedness of
the adaptive learning system, a system that changes asso-
ciation strengths just to increase the accuracy of the next
prediction yet is insensitive to the particular learning path
that led to the associations.
In addition, our theory is incomplete because it only
makes predictions about some aspects of the two learning
processes. For example, it does not specify whether the two
learning systems are configural or elemental, which is im-
portant because configural processes should generally lead
to weaker transfers of brand associations within and between
brand portfolios. That is, if learning is configural, it should
be more product specific, and learning about one product
should have less influence on evaluations of other products
that share only some of the base product’s features. In the
adaptive learning literature, Shanks and his colleagues have
recently found strong configural learning effects (Lopez et
al. 1998; Shanks, Charles, et al. 1998; Shanks, Darby, and
Charles 1998). That is, learning cannot be described solely
in terms of the elements (or cues) that make up a stimulus,
as in the LMS, ADIT, and RASHNL models (Gluck and
Bower 1988; Kruschke 1996; Kruschke and Johansen 1999).
Instead, learning models need to include representations of
the stimulus as a whole, as in configural models such as
Pearce’s (1994) configural model and Kruschke’s (1992)
ALCOVE model, in order to be able to explain both ele-
mental cue interaction effects and configural effects. How-
ever, some catastrophic interference experiments showing
configural effects suggest that such hybrid models that try
to explain both elemental and configural effects are not con-
figural enough (Shanks, Charles, et al. 1998; Shanks, Darby,
and Charles 1998). In contrast, purely configural models, in
which only the presented configuration is activated, can
never account for cue interaction. Thus, it seems that ele-
mental and configural learning both exist (cf. Williams et
al. 1994).
We speculate that elemental and configural effects are not
the result of one single process and that any attempt to create
one model describing both is doomed to fail. Instead, we
believe that elemental learning effects are the result of adap-
tive learning and that configural learning effects are the
result of HAM learning. This speculation is motivated by
our hypothesis that adaptive learning is a more focused and
selective process that identifies specific stimulus elements
as outcomes to be predicted and other specific elements as
cues used to predict. In contrast, we describe HAM learning
as a more general process that stores information from the
whole stimulus. Configural adaptive learning models such
as Pearce’s (1994) add configurality to a basic LMS model
in an attempt to describe both processes. It is possible that
adaptive learning is well described by a very simple ele-
mental model. Pearce’s configural addition may be useful
as the foundation of a cue-independent, configural HAM
learning process. In particular, we believe that a model that
uses Pearce’s general network structure and configural ac-
tivation process but replaces the LMS-type configural node-
outcome learning rule (App. A, Eq. A11) by a simple Heb-
bian updating rule (App. A, Eq. A5) may be promising as
a model of HAM learning.
Another area for future exploration is whether the adap-
tive learning process is sequential or parallel. Most models
outlined in this article are essentially parallel models, be-
cause each learning experience leads to the simultaneous
updating of more than one association. However, many char-
acteristics of human judgment can be explained in terms of
selective sequential hypothesis testing (Sanbonmatsu et al.
1998). According to Sanbonmatsu and his colleagues, hu-
man judgment is often not based on the simultaneous in-
vestigation of several different hypotheses but on a selective
top-down process in which one hypothesis is tested at a time
and hypothesis testing is halted as soon as one hypothesis
provides a sufficient (but not necessarily optimal) answer
to the question at hand. One of the phenomena easily ex-
plained by such a process is the blocking phenomenon. If
consumers first confirm the hypothesis that the first cue (e.g.,
a family brand name) predicts the outcome, hypothesis test-
ing stops and the predictive value of an additional cue (e.g.,
an ingredient brand name) is never assessed. Thus, learning
about the predictive value of the additional cue is blocked.
Although it is not clear that all cue interaction phenomena
outlined here and elsewhere can be explained in terms of a
selective, sequential hypothesis testing process (see Jani-
szewski and van Osselaer [2000] for a wide range of cue
interaction phenomena), it is possible that updating in the
adaptive learning system is sequential instead of parallel
(van Osselaer and Alba 2000).
Recently, Kruschke and Johansen (1999) proposed a par-
allel model with an attention allocation function that speeds
updating for one or a few cues while slowing updating for
the remaining cues. Thus, this model seems to provide a
compromise between a parallel process that has similar up-
dating rates for all cues and a purely sequential system that
has zero updating rates for all but one cue. An empirical
test of these three processes (equal parallel updating, selec-
tive parallel updating, and selective sequential updating)
would provide important insight into the exact nature of
adaptive processing. On a more practical level, such a test
would provide insight into the specificity of consumer learn-
ing, with implications for the optimal stimulus complexity
in marketing communications used in adaptive learning con-
texts. In addition to providing an impetus for specifying and
testing the selective hypothesis testing process, the experi-
ments and theory presented here might help to clarify (1)
the exact nature of the other type of processing in Sanbon-
matsu et al.’s (1998) framework comparative processing and
(2) when each type of processing governs consumer pre-
dictions and evaluations. We believe that there would be
significant scientific benefit in the development of a formal
model of sequential hypothesis testing (perhaps using the
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RULe-plus-EXception [RULEX] model by Nosofsky, Pal-
meri, and McKinley [1994] as a starting point). In our ex-
perience, working with formal models has helped us to spec-
ify the exact nature of processes; to find, through thought
experiments and simulations, conditions that allow clear fal-
sification of a model; and to make new predictions about
unknown phenomena (see Smith [1996] and Smith and
DeCoster [1998] for a similar argument).
In addition to the dual-process theory by Sanbonmatsu et
al. (1998), it would also be of interest to investigate the
similarities and differences between our theory and another
connectionist dual-process theory by Smith and DeCoster
(1999). They discern two types of processing, associative
and rule-based processing. Associative processing makes
use of a slow learning system and rule-based processing
makes use of both a fast and a slow learning system. In-
terestingly, these processes and learning systems do not
seem to map directly onto our two processes and learning
systems. In fact, the learning model used for the slow learn-
ing system, described by Smith and DeCoster (1998) and
developed by McClelland and Rumelhart (1986), uses the
same Delta learning rule as the adaptive learning models
presented here. Smith and DeCoster (1999) are not very
specific about the exact nature of their rule-based process.
However, it is defined as a symbolic reasoning process rather
than an associative process. Thus, it is possible that there
are at least three learning processes involved in consumer
prediction and evaluation—a slow and low-effort HAM-type
process, a faster and higher-effort but still associative adap-
tive process, and an even faster and more resource-intensive
symbolic reasoning process that can come up with abstract
rules. This would be consistent with other recent findings
in the learning literature showing that, in addition to an
adaptive associative process, there might also be a rule-
based process (e.g., Erickson and Kruschke 1998; Shanks
and Darby 1998). In sum, there are interesting similarities
and differences between our theory and these other theories.
What most distinguishes ours is the inclusion of a cue-
independent, backward-looking process used to make pre-
dictions and evaluations, plus our findings of moderators
determining when which process will govern responses.
This leads us to the issue of the interaction between the
two learning systems. Gilbert (1999) describes four ways
in which two processes might interact. One possibility is
selective combination, in which, on any occasion, only one
system is active. A second possibility is competitive com-
bination, in which both systems always produce an output,
but only the strongest has any influence on behavior. Third,
it is possible that combination is consolidative, in which
both systems are active and both systems’ output shows up
in behavior. Fourth, combination might be corrective, in
which one system is active by default and the other system
is only activated when the first system fails and sensitively
corrects the first. We believe the adaptive and HAM systems
combine in a fifth way. Study 4 seems to support our as-
sumptions about how the adaptive and HAM learning sys-
tems interact. Because HAM learning does not require con-
sumers actively to focus their learning on predicting a
specific outcome, we expect that HAM learning is always
active. That is, consumers always store and cross-reference
all stimulus elements. In contrast, adaptive learning may be
restricted to a narrower set of circumstances, because adap-
tive associations are only formed between product cues and
outcomes that consumers are motivated to learn to predict.
Thus, we believe that HAM associations are always formed
but are overpowered by adaptive associations whenever the
latter are available. This overpowering could be all or noth-
ing or could take the form of a weighted sum, with either
the intensity or weight of the adaptive system’s output being
much stronger than the HAM system’s output. We speculate
that it is not the case that only one process can be active at
the same time (in contrast to selective combination), that it
is not true that both processes are always active (in contrast
to competitive or consolidative combination), and that one
process is not sensitively correcting the output of the other
process (in contrast to corrective combination).
In sum, the studies presented here reconcile two streams
of research by showing that consumers have two learning
systems at their disposal that can be used to make predictions
about products. The studies investigate two critical aspects
of these two systems, cue interaction versus cue independ-
ence and being forward looking versus backward looking,
and several moderators that determine which system guides
responses. However, many other differences may exist be-
tween the learning systems, and many other moderators may
determine when each system drives consumer behavior.
APPENDIX A
MODELS
In Appendix A, we describe the four learning models
introduced in the first part of the article.
THE DA MODEL
The DA model uses a simple Hebbian or “coincident
activation” learning rule (Janiszewski and van Osselaer
2000). In the DA model, the change in the association
strength (Dsij) between two nodes i and j in one learning
trial is given by
Ds p b ∗ a ∗ q , (A1)ij i j
where is a learning rate parameter,b(0 ! b ! 1) a (a pi i
is the activation level of cue i (i.e., whether the cue0, 1)
is present or not), and qj is the experienced level of associate
j (e.g., the value of the associate). Thus, the association
between a cue and an associate is strengthened every time
that the cue is presented with the associate and this learning
is independent of the associations between other cues and
the same associate. Finally, the level of activation of the
associate j, expressed as oj, is an additive function of in-
coming activation from all cues, or
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o p S (a ∗ s ). (A2)j ip1, n i ij
THE ACT-R MODEL
According to the ACT-R model (Anderson 1993; An-
derson and Lebiere 1998), declarative knowledge is repre-
sented as a network of concept nodes connected by asso-
ciations that are strengthened each time two events co-occur.
The ACT-R model predicts that the activation of an outcome
node oj is a function of that node’s base level of activation
and of incoming activation of the outcome node j from(b )j
available cueing nodes i (sij), weighted for their activation
level or(a ),i
o p b  S (a ∗ s ). (A3)j j ip1, n i ij
The ACT-R model proposes association strengths are(s )ij
a logarithmic function of (1) the association strength at the
beginning of the learning session ( ); (2) a positive weight-∗rij
ing constant (w); (3) the empirical ratio, eij, of the conditional
probability of outcome node j’s presence given cue node i’s
presence divided by the base rate of outcome node j’s pres-
ence; and (4) the frequency [F(i)] of the presentation of cue
i. More formally, the associative strength between cue i and
outcome j is
s p log (r ), (A4)ij ij
where
∗r p [r ∗ w e ∗ F(i)]/[w F(i)], (A5)ij ij ij
and where
e p P( jFi)/P( j). (A6)ij
In this model, it should be noted that the numerator and
denominator include the common term [ ] but thatw F(i)
the numerator includes a adjustment to the weighting∗rij
constant (w) and an eij adjustment to the frequency of pre-
sentation [F(i)] term. First, it is important to recognize that
without these adjustments, the ratio would take on the value
of one, the log of the ratio would take on the value zero,
and association strength between cue node i and outcome
node j would be zero. Second, including the adjustment∗rij
to the weighting constant (w) allows the model to represent
prior learning ( takes on a value of one when there is no∗rij
prior learning and a value different from one when there is
prior learning). Third, including the eij adjustment allows
the model to increase association strengths for cues that are
more strongly correlated with the outcome.
THE LMS MODEL
Identical to the DA model, the LMS adaptive network
model (LMS model) assumes the activation of associate j
is equal to the sum of the incoming activation from all
activated cues i (Eq. A2). In addition, the LMS model posits
an error-reduction property, which says that the updating of
association strengths is a function of the error between a
predicted outcome and feedback about the outcome that is
actually experienced (e.g., Gluck and Bower 1988; Jani-
szewski and van Osselaer 2000; McClelland and Rumelhart
1986). This results in the following learning rule:
Ds p b ∗ a ∗ (q  o ), (A7)ij i j j
where Dsij is the change in the association from i to
is a learning rate parameter, isj, b(0 ! b ! 1) a (a p 0, 1)i i
the activation on input node i, qj is the experienced outcome
(e.g., whether a benefit is present), and oj (defined in Eq.
A2) is the expectation about whether the outcome will be
present. Together, the additivity and error-reduction prop-
erties lead to a third property, cue interaction. That is, up-
dating of the association between one cue and an associate
depends on the presence of other cues in the same learning
trial.
PEARCE’S (1994) CONFIGURAL MODEL
Pearce’s (1994) configural model extends the LMS model
to include configural effects and an attentional limitation.
The configural model consists of three layers of connections
between four layers of nodes. First, the presence or absence
of a number of cues i is represented by a layer of input
nodes i that are activated if cue i is present and not activated
if cue i is absent. The input layer is connected to an equal
number of hidden nodes i representing each input node’s
internal activation. This internal activation is a function of
the activation of the corresponding input node and of the
presence of other cues, such that activation of one cue’s
internal activation node is reduced when other cues are pre-
sent. Thus, the first layer of connections performs an atten-
tional function, reducing attention to any one cue with each
additional cue that is present. Formally, the activation, ai,
of hidden node i if cue i is present is given by the following
equation:
a p 1/ n, (A8)i
where n is the total number of cues present in the stimulus
pattern.
Cue-specific internal activation is then fed through to a
second layer of hidden nodes representing whole stimulus
configurations (i.e., if consumers encounter stimuli F1 and
F1I1, two different configural nodes are created). Formally,
the activation, cj, of configural node j is given by
2c p [S (a ∗ s )] , (A9)j ip1, n i ij
where ai is the activation level of the internal activation
node of cue i and where sij is the strength of the association
between the internal activation node of cue i and configural
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node j. Association strengths between cues’ internal acti-
vation hidden nodes and configural hidden nodes are the
result of a one-shot learning process. The first time a stim-
ulus is encountered, the association strengths between the
internal activation nodes of its elements and the correspond-
ing configural node are set to be equal to the activation
levels of the internal activation nodes. Thus, the mapping
from internal activation nodes to configural nodes remains
constant.
Finally, the activation of the configural nodes is fed for-
ward from the configural nodes to one or more outcome
nodes. As in the other models, activation, ok, of each out-
come node k is an additive function of incoming activations.
Each incoming activation is determined by the activation
level (cj) of the configural node and by the strength of the
association between the configural node and the outcome
node :(s )jk
o p S (c ∗ s ). (A10)k jp1, m j jk
In this model, the configural node-outcome associations sjk
are updated (learned) according to the following rule:
Ds p b ∗ c ∗ (q  o ), (A11)jk j k k
where is the change in the association from configuralDsjk
node j to outcome node is a learning ratek, b(0 ! b ! 1)
parameter, cj is the activation of configural node j, qk is the
experienced outcome, and ok (defined in Eq. A10) is the
expected level of the outcome. On each trial, only the con-
figural node-outcome associations of the most strongly ac-
tive configural node are updated. This should always be the
configural node representing the currently present stimulus
pattern.
APPENDIX B
DESIGN SUMMARIES
TABLE B1
STUDY 1 AND SECOND PHASE OF STUDY 4 (BENEFIT 1 ONLY)
Design Operationalization of design
Brand Benefit 1 Benefit 2 Sample brand Benefit 1 Benefit 2
L   Treats Mild cocoa Dry
F1   Delight Mild cocoa Moist
F1I 1   Delight w/ Baker’s Blend Syrup Strong cocoa Moist
F2   Buon Chocolate Strong cocoa Dry
F2I 2   Buon Chocolate w/ Silk’n Morsels Strong cocoa Moist
F2I 2   Buon Chocolate w/ Silk’n Morsels Strong cocoa Moist
TABLE B2
STUDY 2
Condition 1
Design Operationalization of design
Brand Benefit 1 Benefit 2 Sample brand Benefit 1 Benefit 2
L   Treats Mild cocoa Dry
F1   Delight Mild cocoa Moist
F1I 1   Delight w/ Baker’s Blend Syrup Strong cocoa Moist
F2   Buon Chocolate Strong cocoa Dry
F2I 2   Buon Chocolate w/ Silk’n Morsels Strong cocoa Moist
F2I2   Buon Chocolate w/ Silk’n Morsels Strong cocoa Moist
Condition 2
L   Treats Mild cocoa Dry
F1   Delight Mild cocoa Moist
F1I1   Delight w/ Baker’s Blend Syrup Strong cocoa Moist
F1I 1   Delight w/ Baker’s Blend Syrup Strong cocoa Moist
F2   Buon Chocolate Strong cocoa Dry
F2I 2   Buon Chocolate w/ Silk’n Morsels Strong cocoa Moist
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TABLE B3
STUDY 3
Design Operationalization of design
Brand Attribute Benefit 1 Benefit 2 Sample brand Attribute 1 Benefit 1 Benefit 2
L    Treats Natural Mild Dry
F2    Buon Chocolate Dutch Strong Dry
F2I 2    Buon Chocolate w/ Silk’n Morsels Dutch Strong Moist
F2I 2    Buon Chocolate w/ Silk’n Morsels Dutch Strong Moist
F1    Delight Natural Mild Moist
F1I 1    Delight w/ Baker’s Blend Syrup Dutch Strong Moist
APPENDIX C
ILLUSTRATED MODEL PREDICTIONS
In Appendix C, we illustrate how the models can be used
to make predictions about the association strength between
I1 and I2 and the benefit chocolate flavor. We note that the
same base design is used in all four studies (see App. B).
We also note that the assumption of asymptotic learning of
F1 benefit and F2 benefit associations in F-only trials, used
in the predictions of the LMS and Pearce models, is con-
firmed in study 4.
THE DA MODEL
The DA model predicts that the difference between the
I1-outcome and I2-outcome associations should be equal to
b. For example, in study 1, the strength of the association
between I1 (e.g., Baker’s Blend) and benefit 1 (B1, e.g.,
chocolate flavor) should be equal to b ∗ a ∗ q pi j
. The strength of the association between I2b ∗ 1 ∗ 1p b
(e.g., Silk ’n Morsels) and B1 should be equal to
, because I2 and B12 ∗ b ∗ a ∗ q p 2 ∗ b ∗ 1 ∗ 1p 2bi j
were presented together twice. Thus, the difference in out-
come activations in the F3I1 and F3I2 test trials is equal to
.b 2bp b
THE ACT-R MODEL
The ACT-R model also predicts that the difference be-
tween the I1-outcome and I2-outcome associations should be
negative. In our experiments, we keep eij constant, typically
at 1.5 (i.e., ) for both ingredient brandP( jFi)/P( j)p 1.0/.67
associations. We keep the at 1 (i.e., both ingredient brands∗rij
are novel). The strength of the association between I1 and
the flavor benefit should, then, be equal to
∗s p log {[r ∗ w e ∗ F(I )]/[w F(I )]}I -B I -B I -B 1 11 1 1 1 1 1
p log [(1 ∗ w 1.5 ∗ 1)/(w 1)]
p log [(w 1.5)/(w 1)].
The strength of the association between I2 and the flavor
benefit should be equal to
∗s p log {[r ∗ w e ∗ F(I )]/[w F(I )]}I -B I -B I -B 2 22 1 2 1 2 1
p log [(1 ∗ w 1.5 ∗ 2)/(w 2)]
p log [(w 3)/(w 2)].
Thus, the difference in outcome activation between the F3I1
and F3I2 test trials should be equal to log[(w 1.5)/(w
. This difference is negative for1)] log [(w 3)/(w 2)]
all positive values of w.
THE LMS MODEL
The LMS model predicts that the difference between the
I1-outcome and I2-outcome associations should be positive.
For example, suppose experiencing the mild chocolate flavor
(B1) of the Delight product (F1) is represented as a negative
outcome of1. For predicted and experienced outcome(q )j
to be equal, the outcome prediction on F1-only trials has to
be 1. This implies that the asymptotic F1-B1 association
strength also has to be 1 (using Eq. A2, o pB1). Sup-1 ∗ s  0 ∗ s  0 ∗ s  0 ∗ s p 1F -B F -B I -B I -B1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1
pose experiencing the strong chocolate flavor (B1) on the
next trial of Delight with Baker’s Blend Syrup (F1I1) is
represented as . To decrease the large prediction error1
(which should be equal to ), theq  o p 1 [1]p 2B B1 1
I1-B1 association should be updated to
Ds I -B1 1
p b ∗ a ∗ (q  o )I B B1 1 1
p b ∗ 1 ∗ [1 (1)]p 2b,
where b is a learning rate that cannot be negative (see Eq.
A7). Thus, after the F1I1 trial, equals 2b. For the F2s I -B1 1
family brand name (e.g., Buon Chocolate), the positive ex-
perience can be represented as a , and should be 1.1 sF -B2 1
Experiencing the strong chocolate flavor (B1) on the next
trial of Buon Chocolate with Silk’n Morsels can also be
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represented as a . Because is equal to 1, the pre-1 sF -B2 1
diction error on the F2I2 trials is zero, and there should be
no updating of the I2-B1 association or
Ds I -B2 1
p b ∗ a ∗ (q  o )I B B2 1 1
p b ∗ 1 ∗ (1 1)p 0.
Thus, after the two F2I2 trials, equals zero. In sum, thes I -B2 1
difference in outcome activations in the F3I1 and F3I2 test
trials should be positive and equal to 2b.
PEARCE’S (1994) CONFIGURAL MODEL
The Pearce (1994) model also predicts that the difference
between the I1-outcome and I2-outcome associations should
be positive. When F1-only is presented, the F1 configural
node should have an activation of
2c p [S (a ∗ s )]F ip1, n i ij1
2p (a ∗ s )F F -F1 1 1
2p (1 ∗ 1) p 1.
The same is true for the F2 configural mode. To minimize
error when F1-only is presented, the asymptotic association
between the F1 configural node and benefit 1 (B1) should
be equal to 1, so that o p S (c ∗ s )pB jp1, m j jk1
. Next, on the F1I1 trial, internalc ∗ s p 1 ∗1p 1F F -B1 1 1
activation of the F1 and I1 cue-specific nodes is equal to
. The associations between the F1 internal ac-1/ 2 p .7071
tivation node and the F1I1 configural node, and between the
I1 internal activation node and the F1I1 configural node,
should both also be equal to .7071. This leads to an acti-
vation of the F1I1 configural node of
2c p [(a ∗ s ) (a ∗ s )]F I F F -F I I I -F I1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2p [(.7071 ∗ .7071) (.7071 ∗ .7071)] p 1.
It also leads to an activation of the F1 configural node of
2c p [(a ∗ s ) (a ∗ s )]F F F -F I I -F1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2p [(.7071 ∗ 1) (.7071 ∗ 0)] p .5.
Given that the F1I1 configural node has not yet established
an association with benefit 1 and that the F1 configural node
has an association strength of 1, the outcome activation
on the F1I1 trial should be equal to
o p (c ∗ s ) (c ∗ s )B F I F I -B F F -B1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
p (1 ∗ 0) (.5 ∗1)p .5.
The F1I1-B1 association should then be updated to be equal
to
Ds p b ∗ c ∗ (q  o )F I -B F I B B1 1 1 1 1 1 1
p b ∗ 1 ∗ [1 (.5)]p b ∗ 1.5.
At test, the F3I1 stimulus should activate the F3I1 configural
node, which has no association to benefit 1, but should also
partially activate the F1I1 configural node, at
2c p [(a ∗ s ) (a ∗ s )]F I F F -F I I I -F I1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
2p [(.7071 ∗ 0) (.7071 ∗ .7071)] p .25.
This should lead to an outcome activation on the F3I1 test
trial of
o p (c ∗ s ) (c ∗ s )B F I F I -B F I F I -B1 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
p (1 ∗ 0) (.25 ∗ b ∗ 1.5)p .375b.
To minimize error when F2-only is presented, the asymp-
totic association between the F2 configural node and benefit
1 (B1) should be equal to 1. Next, with regard to the acti-
vation of configural nodes, the situation is exactly parallel
to that for the F1I1 stimulus. On the F2I2 trials, internal ac-
tivation of the F2 and I2 cue-specific nodes is equal to .7071.
The associations between the F2 internal activation node and
the F2I2 configural node, and between the I2 internal acti-
vation node and the F2I2 configural node, are also equal to
.7071, leading to an activation of the F2I2 configural node
of 1 and of the F2 configural node of .5. Because the F2I2
configural node has a zero association with benefit 1 and
the F2 configural node has an association strength of 1, the
outcome activation on the first F2I2 trial is equal to
o p (c ∗ s ) (c ∗ s )B F I F I -B F F -B1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1
p (1 ∗ 0) (.5 ∗ 1)p .5.
The F2I2-B1 association should be updated to
Ds p b ∗ c ∗ (q  o )F I -B F I B B2 2 1 2 2 1 1
p b ∗ 1 ∗ (1 .5)p b ∗ .5.
On the second F2I2 trial, the output activation of benefit 1
should then be equal to
o p (c ∗ s ) (c ∗ s )B F I F I -B F F -B1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1
p (1 ∗ b ∗ .5) (.5 ∗ 1)p (b ∗ .5) .5.
This leads to further updating of the F2I2-B1 association by
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Ds p b ∗ c ∗ (q  o )F I -B F I B B2 2 1 2 2 1 1
2p b ∗ 1 ∗ [1 (b ∗ .5 .5)]p .5b .5b .
Thus, the final strength of the F2I2-B1 association is equal
to . At test, the F3I2 stim-2 2(.5b) (.5b .5b )p b .5b
ulus should activate the F3I2 configural node completely and
should activate the F2I2 configural node at .25. This leads
to an outcome activation on the F3I2 test trial of
o p (c ∗ s ) (c ∗ s )B F I F I -B F I F I -B1 3 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 1
2 2p (1 ∗ 0) [.25 ∗ (b .5b )]p .25b .125b .
Thus, the difference in outcome activations in the F3I1 and
F3I2 test trials according to the Pearce model should be
positive and equal to 2.375b (.25b .125b )p .125b
.
2
.125b
Despite the fact that the four models make clear predic-
tions in terms of outcome activations, we cannot make pre-
dictions about subjects’ responses beyond the facts that the
HAM models predict a negative difference between benefit
1 ratings of F3I1 and F3I2 and that the adaptive network
models predict a positive difference. This is the case because
the learning rates should be allowed to differ between mod-
els and because the function relating outcome activations to
responses is not constrained beyond being monotonically
positive. Thus, any learning rate could lead to any size, but
not any direction, of response difference.
[Received March 2000. Revised February 2001. David
Glen Mick served as editor, and Frank R. Kardes served
as associate editor for this article.]
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